I was disturbed by aspects of Craig Callender's post "Nothing to see here," on the uncertainty principle, in the New York Times' online philosophy blog "The Stone," and I'm pondering a response, which I hope to post here soon. But in the process of pondering, some questions have arisen which I'd like to know the answers to. Here are a couple:
Callender thinks it is important that quantum theory be formulated in a way that does not posit measurement as fundamental. In particular he discusses the Bohmian variant of quantum theory (which I might prefer to describe as an alternative theory) as one of several possibilities for doing so. In this theory, he claims,
Uncertainty still exists. The laws of motion of this theory imply that one can’t know everything, for example, that no perfectly accurate measurement of the particle’s velocity exists. This is still surprising and nonclassical, yes, but the limitation to our knowledge is only temporary. It’s perfectly compatible with the uncertainty principle as it functions in this theory that I measure position exactly and then later calculate the system’s velocity exactly.
While I've read Bohm's and Bell's papers on the subject, and some others, it's been a long time in most cases, and this theory is not something I consider very promising as physics even though it is important as an illustration of what can be done to recover quantum phenomena in a somewhat classical theory (and of the weird properties one can end up with when one tries to do so). So I don't work with it routinely. And so I'd like to ask anyone, preferably more expert than I am in technical aspects of the theory, though not necessarily a de Broglie-Bohm adherent, who can help me understand the above claims, in technical or non-technical terms, to chime in in the comments section.
I have a few specific questions. It's my impression that in this theory, a "measurement of position" does not measure the pre-existing value of the variable called, in the theory, "position". That is, if one considers a single trajectory in phase space (position and momentum, over time), entering an apparatus described as a "position measurement apparatus", that apparatus does not necessarily end up pointing to, approximately, the position of the particle when it entered the apparatus.
Question 1: Is that correct?
A little more discussion of Question 1. On my understanding, what is claimed is, rather, something like: that if one has a probability distribution over particle positions and momenta and a "pilot wave" (quantum wave function) whose squared amplitude agrees with these distributions (is this required in both position and momentum space? I'm guessing so), then the probability (calculated using the distribution over initial positions and momenta, and the deterministic "laws of motion" by which these interact with the "pilot wave" and the apparatus) for the apparatus to end up showing position in a given range, is the same as the integral of the squared modulus of the wavefunction, in the position representation, over that range. Prima facie, this could be achieved in ways other than having the measurement reading being perfectly correlated with the initial position on a given trajectory, and my guess is that in fact it is not achieved in that way in the theory. If that were so it seems like the correlation should hold whatever the pilot wave is. Now, perhaps that's not a problem, but it makes the pilot wave feel a bit superfluous to me, and I know that it's not, in this theory. My sense is that what happens is more like: whatever the initial position is, the pilot wave guides it to some---definite, of course---different final position, but when the initial distribution is given by the squared modulus of the pilot wave itself, then the distribution of final positions is given by the squared modulus of the (initial, I guess) pilot wave.
But if the answer to question 1 is "Yes", I have trouble understanding what Callender means by "I measure position exactly". Also, regardless of the answer to Question 1, either there is a subtle distinction being made between measuring "perfectly accurately" and measuring "exactly" (in which case I'd like to know what the distinction is), or these sentences need to be reformulated more carefully. Not trying to do a gotcha on Callender here, just trying to understand the claim, and de Broglie Bohm.
My second question relates to Callender's statement that:
It’s perfectly compatible with the uncertainty principle as it functions in this theory that I measure position exactly and then later calculate the system’s velocity exactly
Question 2: How does this way of ascertaining the system's velocity differ from the sort of "direct measurement" that is, presumably, subject to the uncertainty principle? I'm guessing that by the time one has enough information (possibly about further positions?) to calculate what the velocity was, one can't do with it the sorts of things that one could have done if one had known the position and velocity simultaneously. But this depends greatly on what it would mean to "have known" the position and/or velocity, which --- especially if the answer to Question 1 was "Yes"--- seems a rather subtle matter.
So, physicists and other readers knowledgeable on these matters (if any such exist), your replies with explanations, or links to explanations, of these points would be greatly appreciated. And even if you don't know the answers, but know de Broglie-Bohm well on a technical level... let's figure this out! (My guess is that it's well known, and indeed that the answer to Question 1 in particular is among the most basic things one learns about this interpretation...)
Callendar's piece bothered me, too (and for reasons not limited to skepticism about Bohmian mechanics). I'll be interested in any answer that emerges to Question 1.
Hi Alex---
I'll probably write up the first in a series of posts on this, soon. I've been rereading Bohm's 1951 and 1952 Physical Review papers on the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, and they strongly suggest that the answer to Question 1 is "yes". I phrased question 1 for position measurements; Bohm very explicitly states, with examples, that the answer to the analogous question for momentum measurements is "yes". The last sentence of section 5 of the second Physical Review paper (on page 387 in Wheeler and Zurek's edited collection "Quantum Theory and Measurement", Princeton University Press, 1983) states "However, the actual particle momentum existing before the measurement took place is quite different from the numerical value obtained for the momentum "observable," which, in the usual interpretation, is called the "momentum." "
I would still like to see an example for a position measurement. Also I would like to see an explicit calculation of one trajectory as an illustration. Of course trajectory calculations are supposed to be quite challenging in this theory---another reason I tend not to like it: nature is thought to be "doing a really hard calculation" in order, in the end, to give rise to observable phenomena much more easily calculated using standard quantum mechanics (not that these calculations are necessarily easy). Still I am pretty sure this is doable, at least computationally.
I have a lot of sympathy for Callender's desire to debunk uninformed pop-culture versions of the uncertainty principle, but I too had a lot of problems with the way he went about it, and not just with the promotion of the Bohmian interpretation.
Howard
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