Russell Blackford formulates what he thinks is Thomas Nagel's argument for "the existence of objective values".  I think I disagree with Blackford on this.  Blackford's point seems to be that although he doesn't want to die a premature death, or suffer horrible torture, it wouldn't really be bad if he did.  Or at least, that he is not logically committed to thinking it would be.  Perhaps the logical point is correct, I'm not sure.  I would have to figure out what the difference is between valuing something and thinking it is really valuable.  I'm kind of suspicious of this supposed difference, but I suppose it merits close thought.  (References, anyone?) How does it differ from the difference between thinking the cat is on the mat and thinking the cat is really on the mat?  True, there is the difference, in Blackford's formulation, between "valuing X" and "thinking X is valuable".  Is that the crucial bit of Blackford's argument?  Or, since we're concerned with practical reason here, is to state or think or that one values something just to state that or think that one will take action to bring it about, but not to make the "deontic" statement that it should come about?  (All subject to qualifications about other things being equal, or about how it should be traded off with other things valued, of course.)  But even if this distinction makes sense, which it may well do, I think Nagel would argue... and I would follow him... that most of us just DO not only value certain things, but think that those things really are valuable.