Smash the Power of Imperial Finance Capital

A must-read article by Kevin Drum at Mother Jones on the power of the finance lobby.  He cites figures from (but doesn't link) this page at the politics-'n-money tracking website opensecrets.org on how the finance lobby, at $475 million in political spending, dwarfs even the healthcare sector, the next relatively specific sector at $167 million.  There are four categories inbetween, however, comprising one and a quarter million dollars, so clearly a lot of the action is there, in "Other, Ideology/Single-issue, Misc Business, and Lawyers and Lobbyists".  Finance, in this way of slicing things, is actually finance, real estate, and insurance, so it includes other activities than strictly financial ones although the role of real estate and insurance in the financial sector, and the recent meltdown, is well known.  Still, this is a big wad.

The article has lots of details about how they've used that power, and what they got for their money.  Kinda makes you want to revisit more sympathetically the kind of attitude represented by the headlines of the minute left-sectarian fringe newspapers that used to be (and must still be---some things will never change) hawked at demonstrations, and by the title of this post.  Or by this quote (also via Kevin Drum) from a rabble-rousing Thirties radical:

We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace — business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering.

Drum is quite a good writer, sprinkling his piece with to-the-point metaphors (Long Term Capital Management was "a relative minnow", and "leverage is a harsh mistress"), and I'm going to add him to my RSS feed if I ever get one set up.  FDR (the rabble-rousing radical quoted above) wasn't too bad with the quotable one-liners either---the remainder of the quote includes the line "We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by organized mob".  Okay, he had good speechwriters.

"The real size of the bailout", also at MoJo, is interesting but really needs a lot more analysis and explanation.  They peg it at $14 trillion, calling it "the price of the bailout" at one point, but I'm not convinced that everything in the graph is money down the tubes for the government, rather than pay-ins to funds for subsidized loans and asset purchases some of which will turn out to be repaid, or worth something.

Update:  There's now some more explanation here.

So, does Niall Ferguson support repealing the Bush tax cuts?

Niall Ferguson is on about deficits. The Newsweek piece is full of fearmongering and frank imperialism---his biggest worry is that "economic weakness is endangering our global power".  Well, I guess US global power, despite plenty of abuses, is more benign than most other varieties I could imagine becoming more prominent as it ebbed (except perhaps EU global power)...and could conceivably become more benign if Obama's election ushered in an extended era of sensible, moderately liberal, multilateral policies with the world's wellbeing among their major goals.  But the deficit fearmongering borders on the ludicrous, and while he brings in some reasonable points, the quantitative evidence is often missing and the economic reasoning slipshod or missing too.  What is perhaps most seriously lacking is a reasonable degree of balance between long-term deficit concerns and the need for deficits in the short term.

Let's take the seriously misleading stuff first.  The US economic stimulus is described as "muted" because:

what makes a stimulus actually work is the change in borrowing by the whole public sector. Since the federal government was already running deficits, and since the states are actually raising taxes and cutting spending, the actual size of the stimulus is closer to 4 percent of GDP spread over the years 2007 to 2010—a lot less than that headline 11.2 percent deficit.

This verges on incomprehensible.  First, what is he doing with "spread over the years 2007 to 2010"?  The stimulus bill was passed in early 2009; spreading it over 2007 and 2008, years in which it was not being spent, to get an apparent lower percentage of GDP, is hogwash.  On the other hand, if we take .787 trillion as the size of the stimulus package, and spread it over 2009 and 2010, estimating 2009 GDP at 14.2 trillion and 2010 GDP at 14.697 trillion (a 3.5% growth rate, based on not much but faster than the current pace of recovery; it makes little difference to this calculation), you get a stimulus of about 2.7% of GDP.  That's actually quite a bit less than the 4% Ferguson uses.  But that's a big boost to aggregate demand. Not as big as it should be given the magnitude of the economic shock we've been hit with, but far from negligible.

I have no idea why Ferguson feels the need to start with the size of the deficit as a candidate for the size of the stimulus, and then cut it down because "we were already running deficits" and because "state and local governments are cutting taxes and raising spending".  What matters is the change in the amount of government spending, relative to no stimulus policy.  Ferguson would appear to be overestimating the stimulus, perhaps because he's focusing on the idea that "the deficit is the stimulus" and then "correcting" it---but a recession usually increases deficits automatically by decreasing tax receipts, without (usually) a corresponding cut in spending.  (Many states, though, now do cut spending in response to recession, often because of balanced budget laws.)  So perhaps by doing this he is including some of that recession-induced deficit in his estimate of "the stimulus"...and then reducing his overestimate by spreading it over the two prior years, as well.

The main thing that is misleading, though, is that then he estimates "the cost of this muted stimulus" by using the full deficit.  A recession is going to have a fiscal cost even without stimulus---chalking up the full 11.2% of GDP deficit as the cost of a stimulus, whether 2.7% or 4%, is either dishonest or a mistake that is really hard to excuse in an article for a national publication like Newsweek.  The fact that he uses 4% as the stimulus figure perhaps results from some mixed-up attempt to be a little less than dumb about this while still using the full deficit as the cost---perhaps this can be thought of as a way of including "automatic stabilizers" in federal spending as "stimulus"...but then arbitrarily damping it down by dividing by the extra years.  Anyway, the bottom line is that the variable spending under control of the federal government was increased by 2.7% of GDP, and roughly speaking that 2.7% is the additional cost in current dollars of the additional fiscal stimulus.  Actually, the cost is slightly less, for reasons I'll explain shortly.  11.2% reflects the "fiscal" cost of the recession including, but not limited to, the additional stimulus spending.  A serious macroeconomic estimate of the fiscal cost of stimulus actually needs to take into account that, if you believe the economic models used to justify the stimulus itself, the stimulus increases GDP and so increases tax revenues, and so partially pays for itself.  I haven't done this calculation---lots of people were doing it this spring, and with reasonable figures for multipliers and tax rates---say 20% for taxes and a somewhat generous 1.4 for the spending multiplier---you'd get around a 28% reduction in the total fiscal cost of the stimulus, to around 2% of GDP.  And let's not forget that this fiscal cost is incurred in order to obtain an increase in GDP---with this multiplier, of 3.78% of GDP.  Let's also not forget that this fiscal cost is not a loss of GDP---it is just an increase in government debt.  The GDP gain should be around a full 3.78%---perhaps less, if the stimulus is spread out longer, or the multiplier a bit lower (which it might be because some determinants of spending, like the propensity of businesses to invest, and perhaps of households to consume, may be lower than usual in the current climate of fear), but not less by the fiscal cost.

So, the 11.2% of GDP estimated federal deficit for 2009 (I should check that this is the change in net, rather than gross, public debt) is just not the cost of the "muted" stimulus, in any sense.  The "muting" of the stimulus by state budget cuts, etc., is of course argument for more short-term stimulus---for example, aid to states so they don't have to make those budget cuts.

"We are, it seems, having the fiscal policy of a war, without the war."  Well, hurrah for that, I say.  Better to avert a potential depression, and mitigate a serious recession, with war-footing fiscal policy than to get out of a depression the way we did in the 1940s---with the fiscal policy of an actual world war.  Of course we have the Afghan war, and had the Iraq war.  Ferguson pooh-poohs these as contributors to the fiscal situation---and here's the second highly misleading bit of his article.

these are trivial conflicts compared with the world wars, and their contribution to the gathering fiscal storm has in fact been quite modest (little more than 1.8 percent of GDP, even if you accept the estimated cumulative cost of $3.2 trillion published by Columbia economist Joseph Stiglitz in February 2008).

Since, despite the "even if" which suggests he doubts these estimates, no other estimates are offered, let's with Ferguson accept Stiglitz' ones, which seem in line with what I recall hearing.  Where the heck does he come up with "little more than 1.8 percent of GDP"?  Recall that (based on three quarters of official government estimates) I estimated 209 GDP at $14.2 trillion; the total cost of the war comes to 22.5% of this year's GDP!  (Just to clarify: this is not the yearly rate of war spending as a percentage of GDP; but Ferguson is comparing national debt to GDP, so we are looking at war debt on the same footing he's using for total debt.) More to the point, the Nov. 25th, 2009 net federal public debt was $7.612 trillion; the estimated cost of the wars thus comes to 42%---nearly half---of the current public debt!!!  If you take at face value the CBO deficit estimates for 2019 that Ferguson cites (I have not evaluated them myself), those 3.2 trillion are still 22.4% of the projected 2019 debt of $14.3 trillion---hardly negligible (and they'd look like a higher percentage, if debt service on them were included).  I'm guessing the 1.8 percent Ferguson refers to must mean the debt service on the Stiglitz estimate of the cost of the war.  But then, since the entire rest of the public debt is less than one and a half times this war cost estimate, why doesn't Ferguson tell us that the cost of servicing it is currently modest, too?

Now, I haven't looked carefully, recently, into the contribution of the tax cuts of the Bush years to the deficits.  Early in the administration, they probably helped stimulate the economy out of the post-9/11 recession; but on balance they've added plenty to the deficit and the national debt.  By the "radical fiscal reform" we need to forestall the "fatal arithmetic of imperial decline", does Ferguson mean things like the repeal of these tax cuts, and maybe even some modest tax hikes?  And could the current low rates private investors afford the US treasury even on long term borrowing, suggest that just maybe, these investors are pretty confident that the US will, eventually, through some combination of health care reform, tax cut repeal, tax increases, and other measures possibly including non-draconian social security adjustments, bring things into reasonable shape in the medium term, averting Ferguson's calamitous projections?  Perhaps these low rates are a vote of confidence in a Democratic administration, as Democratic administrations have added to the national debt at a substantially lower rate than Republican ones in the past few decades. Numbers along these lines, and more on Ferguson's article, to come.

But I can't end without mentioning Ferguson's comparisons to he fiscal situation of Habsburg Spain in the 16th-17th century, or prerevolutionary France---well, this sounds fun, and there may even be lessons from this far back in history.  Like, maybe it's better to ditch the empire than trash your economy to support it?  I'm not ready to argue historical points with a historian, but it does seem like these comparisons just might be stretching it a bit, as far as the political economy of the situation and the economic and financial policy tools and knowledge available.  I do think the Habsburg Spain analogy might have fit better under Bush and Cheney.

The Fresh and the Salt, or the Raw and the Cooked?---Krugman on how economics got it wrong...and Jonathan Richman on getting it straight.

OK, another must-link, to Paul Krugman's extended New York Times version of something he's blogged on before: the divide between "freshwater" and "saltwater" economists, and how the profession largely failed to anticipate the present economic crisis, and to some extent---especially in the "freshwater" camp---lacks the intellectual tools to deal with it.

Anybody who is interested in understanding the current economic situation, and in getting some background for their attempt to understand it, should read Krugman's article.  (And even more importantly, read Keynes' "General Theory".

As a graduate student in economics round about 1985-87, for a semester at Yale and then for two and a half years at Berkeley (I moved to the Bay Area for love), I got (or rather continued, since I'd taken a bit of econ as an undergrad, and done quite a bit of reading on my own) a squarely "saltwater" (this refers to the coastal US---say, Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, Yale---as opposed to the heartland---say, Minnesota and Chicago, and I'm not sure how far the generalization holds beyond these schools...) economics education, taking first-semester macro, for example, from Jim Tobin.  Yet even then, and there, we were subjected to readings from the "rational expectations" and "real business cycles" school of macro:  Barro, Sargent, Lucas.  I must admit I found this stuff as obviously out of touch with reality then, as Krugman is now telling us it is.  Often  fitted out with impressively technical talk of autocorrelations and regressions, it made claims such as:  systematic use of monetary policy to smooth out business cycles can't have any effect, because rational economic agents will anticipate it; business cycles are due to such "real" factors as shifts---due to underlying changes in "technological possibilities", not due to failure of aggregate demand---in the relative rewards to leisure versus labor, resulting in more people choosing leisure (the "Great Depresssion as Great Vacation" theory, as Krugman skewers it).   The apparently supportive econometric analyses apparently worked---I don't actually recall the econometric critiques of the time, having been more concerned at the time to acquire tools that would help me understand how the economy actually did function, than to score intellectual points against the wrong-headed---by mistaking correlation for causation, and leaving out of the analysis variables of critical importance.  Sometime somebody should---heck, somebody probably has, and I'd love to be pointed towards the analysis---take their macroeconometric work apart.  (Here's a contribution in that direction from one L. H. Summers---pretty devastating, I'd say.)

Krugman's article adduces two, or perhaps three reasons---the "beauty" of rational-agent equilibrium theories, the lure of "sabbaticals at the Hoover Institution and job opportunities on Wall Street" why "freshwater" macro gained as much influence as it did.  Of these, he thinks the "beauty" aspect was the more important.  I think a lengthy exploration of the culture and politics of the economics profession would reveal a lot about how the intertwining of politics, business, and academic culture enabled the rise of the freshwater school.  I'd love to see such a work, by an economically literate social scientist (perhaps even an economist).  Because to my mind, the fact that the bundle of misguided ideas Krugman is referring to as "freshwater economics" gained as much influence as it did, is a serious counterexample to the idea that economics, as practiced in the academy and the more academically-linked think-tanks and policymaking institutions, is a science that makes a serious effort to test its theories against reality, and judges the work of its practitioners accordingly.

Having said that, I'll admit to being very irritated by people who claim that economic theory and academic economics in general have been shown up as useless by the present crisis.  For me, Keynesian theory was always at the heart of macroeconomics, certainly the macro that was taught me when I was in grad school (and that I sought out to teach myself even before then) and its value as a tool to help understand and deal with reality is only accentuated by this slump---as is the value of intelligent, reasoned, reality-based economic analysis more generally.

Anyway, I'd like to think that "freshwater" versus "saltwater" may be a bit of a calumny on the heartland.  Maybe instead of the fresh versus the salt we should (reversing the order) call them, whether or not it fits with Levi-Strauss, the Raw and the Cooked, according to whether they are willing to accept the raw facts of economic slumps, unemployed resources, burst asset bubbles, or can't believe these are what they appear to be and (unintentionally in most cases, perhaps) are moved to cook the data via sophisticated regressions to fit their "markets can't fail" theories. For them, or those seduced by them, maybe the words of Jonathan Richman and the Modern Lovers (if you want to listen, the track was switched with "Modern World [alternate take]" ) are apropos, put into the mouth of a hypothetical bubble-acknowledging, behavioral-economics-friendly, neo-parti-Keynesian, reality-based "raw" economist:

Now I've watched you walk around here.
I've watched you meet these
boyfriends, I know, and you tell me how they're deep.
Look but, if these guys, if they're really so great,
tell me, why can't they at least take this place
and take it straight? Why always stoned,
like hippie Johnny is?
I'm straight and I want to take his place.

Joseph Stiglitz on banks and the bailout. He doesn't sound happy...

Joseph Stiglitz on the bank bailout, from Bloomberg:

“All the ingredients they have so far are weak, and there are several missing ingredients,” Stiglitz said in an interview yesterday. The people who designed the plans are “either in the pocket of the banks or they’re incompetent.”

Stiglitz is only one of the world's best economists;  when he talks, you really *should* listen.

Change the culture, and pander to it---restructure the zombie banks

President Obama, on why the new financial bailout/rescue plan doesn't temporarily "nationalize" the banks (as Sweden successfully did in its 1990s financial crisis):

"Obviously, Sweden has a different set of cultures in terms of how the government relates to markets and America's different. And we want to retain a strong sense of that private capital fulfilling the core -- core investment needs of this country.

And so, what we've tried to do is to apply some of the tough love that's going to be necessary, but do it in a way that's also recognizing we've got big private capital markets and ultimately that's going to be the key to getting credit flowing again."

Well, we voted for change, didn't we, so let's start changing the culture that says we can't even temporarily nationalize the largest banks with the worst balance-sheet issues, in an emergency that threatens the world economy and is in part attributable to these banks' irresponsibility.  Say, as many, including lefties like the former IMF chief economist Ken Rogoff, and lefty financial-history prof Niall Ferguson seem to believe, a belief perhaps even reflected in the stock market's fall on Geithner's press conference, we need to temporarily nationalize the banks.  Call it restructuring, make the call that the zombie banks are effectively bankrupt and an expedited, not court-supervised, receivership is needed, call it tough love, pander to our "culture" of responsibility.  Nationalization is a stupid word to use---it suggests an intention for long-term transfer of banking to the government, and few are seriously suggesting that.  We can do bank restructuring and still "retain a strong sense of that private capital fulfilling the core investment needs of this country." Maybe it can be done, in a stealthier way, through Geithner's plan---but it's apparently not clear to most what Geithner's "plan" will turn out to be, in practice.

Specter and the moderates' second pound of flesh---$30-48 billion

To prevent a filibuster, the administration has to coddle the Senate's Great Men (and Women) Of The Center.  Specter insisting the plan cost less than either the $820 billion house bill or the $838 billion senate version---knocking $40-58 billion, 5% or more, off of a stimulus that may already be too small.  And with the final total looking like it will be $790 billion, pretty much succeeding.   A few Republican moderates (and a Democrat or two) holding the economy hostage so that --- what?  Their power be recognized?  It's been a while since I saw Specter in action in a hearing, but I recall, perhaps erroneously, a really bad gut-check about the guy as he browbeat some poor sap, or maybe some perfectly reasonable guy he happened not to agree with.  True, he's been a voice of reason on some issues, but I was not impressed.   Maybe the Republican moderates feel they have something to take back to their party in order not to be drummed out of it for supporting the plan at all.  Specter also insisting on keeping $10 billion for NIH untouched, while an increase for the NSF was scaled  back by the Senate plan---what's with that, does NIH have a facility in Pennsylvania, or is Specter just a health nut?

Probably Obama's playing it cool at this point is the right game plan... getting the thing passed without having to break a filibuster is probably much better for his long-run efficacy.   But I worry that it is not large enough---that by not signing on, but effectively watering it down through the implcit threat of a filibuster, the Republicans are setting up---not consciously for the most part, except that there probably are those who believe an extended recession is better than any increase in government spending---to try to benefit from an unnecessary extension of the recession.  At some point---perhaps on the second batch of stimulus that will likely turn out to be necess, crying "stimulus was ineffective".  I'm not sure Obama will get a chance to put in another round of stimulus, though he occasionally talks of it.  And, he may be able to get in another round under the guise of longer-term public investment, which he has called for, with stimulus as a side-benefit.  But I imagine there will be a filibuster showdown at some point.  Hopefully the chits will be called in and the moderates will help him break it, maybe with another ceremonial multi-billion-dollar bone or two as compensation.   But it is frustrating that the "senate moderates" are as boneheaded as they are about this.  One can only hope they are doing it because they feel the need to shelter themselves from the ire of their party.

From the AP:

"Earlier Tuesday, the Senate sailed to approval of its $838 billion economic stimulus bill, but with only three moderate Republicans signing on and then demanding the bill's cost go down when the final version emerges from negotiations.

Negotiators initially were working with a target of about $800 billion for the final bill, lawmakers said. But GOP moderate Arlen Specter, R-Pa., said Tuesday night on MSNBC's "Hardball" that he was insisting on a figure at around $780 billion."

Credit for the pound of flesh metaphor to Paul Krugman, back on Feb. 6th.

Greg Mankiw's preferred stimulus plan

Here’s Greg Mankiw’s preferred fiscal stimulus plan.

I would institute an immediate and permanent reduction in the payroll tax, financed by a gradual, permanent, and substantial increase in the gasoline tax. I would make the two tax changes equal in present value, so while the package results in a short-run budget deficit, there is no long-term budget impact. Call it the create-jobs, save-the-environment, reduce-traffic-congestion, budget-neutral tax shift.

I recognize that some state governments are now struggling in light of the macroeconomic crisis. For the next two years, I would let each state governor have the authority to divert a portion of the payroll tax cut in his or her state and take the funds instead as state aid.

Would the equal present value of the payroll tax cut and the gas tax increase be discounted by consumers, who would save in anticipation of the effects of the future increase, resulting in no stimulus to aggregate demand from the policy?  I doubt it; I think it would have some Keynesian multiplier effect nonetheless.  But much of it may be saved, in the form of paying down debt.  It does also give a straightforward reduction in the cost of keeping people employed, a microeconomic incentive effect that might prove to have positive macroeconomic consequences in the present situation.  I still tend to think government spending will, as the simplest Econ 1 Keynesian theory suggests, have a bigger multiplier (a point Greg does explicitly address---he thinks the empirical evidence, though not conclusive, casts some doubt on this).

I’d be most concerned, though, with what would happen to the programs normally funded by payroll taxes:  Social Security and Medicare.  Social Security in particular is at least nominally supported by paying payroll tax receipts into a fund reserved for Social Security payouts to retirees;  would the program continue to pay out at current rates, now funded by general revenues or the gasoline tax?  That might not be such a bad idea, but I’m not sure it’s what Mankiw has in mind….

Note that even if the increased-state-spending-for-payroll-tax-cut exchange would be macroeconomically benefical globally, it might have some negative micro effects if only a few states adopted it, as it would put them at some competitive disadvantage for jobs.

Lessons from Japan on fiscal stimulus?

Paul Krugman's thoughts on Japan from around a decade ago are quite interesting.  He wrote:

But it is quite a stretch to argue that Japan in the 90s is a parallel case [to the US from the Great Depression through World War II]. It might be; but an at least equally, if not more, plausible story is that Japan has a structural excess of saving over investment, even at a zero interest rate; in that case a temporary fiscal stimulus will produce only temporary results.

What continues to amaze me is this: Japan's current strategy of massive, unsustainable deficit spending in the hopes that this will somehow generate a self-sustained recovery is currently regarded as the orthodox, sensible thing to do - even though it can be justified only by exotic stories about multiple equilibria, the sort of thing you would imagine only a professor could believe. Meanwhile further steps on monetary policy - the sort of thing you would advocate if you believed in a more conventional, boring model, one in which the problem is simply a question of the savings-investment balance - are rejected as dangerously radical and unbecoming of a dignified economy.

The "exotic" multiple-equilibrium story must not really be that exotic, since just above this he entertains it as an explanation of the 1996 Asian financial crisis, and of the apparent success of WWII spending in lifting the US sustainably out of depression.

The current situation certainly differs from Japan's in the 90's in many ways, but it does raise the question which of those ways are likely to render fiscal policy more effective for us now, than for Japan then.  Of course, I think no-one would argue that we have a structural excess of savings over investment.  But it does appear that the propensity to save may have shifted up at least temporarily.  Do we face an S-shaped consumption-income relation?  If this slump drags on too long, will we need to target inflation?

At the time Krugman wrote these pieces, he felt the multiple-equilibrium possibility looked dubious because there had been prolonged fiscal stimulus, but it  hadn't rendered itself unnecessary.  Others (see the article linked below) think apparently think it just wasn't large enough, and intense enough over a short period of time, to succeed.  And there are those who think that Japan didn't clean up its banking problem effectively---that its banks still had the balance sheet problems that, Krugman argues, fiscal stimulus can provide breathing room to work out.

Greg Mankiw links to an interesting article on Japan, that largely confirms the continuance of the situation Krugman described in 1999---fiscal stimulus not having rendered itself unnecessary by producing a self-sustaining recovery.  Make sure and read past the first page.  It would be interesting to further investigate the content, and methodology, of the Institute for Local Government study that concluded:

every 1 trillion yen, or about $11.2 billion, spent on social services like care for the elderly and monthly pension payments added 1.64 trillion yen in growth. Financing for schools and education delivered an even bigger boost of 1.74 trillion yen, the report found. But every 1 trillion yen spent on infrastructure projects in the 1990s increased Japan’s gross domestic product, a measure of its overall economic size, by only 1.37 trillion yen, mainly by creating jobs and other improvements like reducing travel times.

Mankiw has his own suggestion for a stimulus plan, about which a bit more in the next post.