Tim Maudlin on the training of physicists, the evolution of intelligence, and more

I had to link this interview with philosopher Tim Maudlin, in the Atlantic, when I read his observation that "The asking of fundamental physical questions is just not part of the training of a physicist anymore." But there's a lot more of interest in the interview as well. I found the article via Andrew Sullivan's blog; Sullivan found Tim's thoughts on the evolution of intelligence to be particularly interesting:

What people haven't seemed to notice is that on earth, of all the billions of species that have evolved, only one has developed intelligence to the level of producing technology. Which means that kind of intelligence is really not very useful. It's not actually, in the general case, of much evolutionary value. We tend to think, because we love to think of ourselves, human beings, as the top of the evolutionary ladder, that the intelligence we have, that makes us human beings, is the thing that all of evolution is striving toward. But what we know is that that's not true. Obviously it doesn't matter that much if you're a beetle, that you be really smart. If it were, evolution would have produced much more intelligent beetles. We have no empirical data to suggest that there's a high probability that evolution on another planet would lead to technological intelligence. There is just too much we don't know.

Indeed there is, but it points out some very interesting questions: is there a tendency, given enough time, for a species intelligent enough to produce technology to arise on an earth-like planet? Is there, perhaps, a tendency for it to inhibit the evolution of other such species? My personal guess (and it's just that, a guess, not supported by careful thought) is that there is such a tendency, but it takes a lot of time, it builds on, and is part of, a slow increase in the complexity of the most complex organisms. This is, of course, probably the "knee-jerk" view. Whether it inhibits the evolution of other species is something I'm less willing to speculate on (though if Neanderthals were another such species, we may have some evidence (one case!) for inhibition of the branching of a potentially technologically-capable intelligent species into two such species). Whether vertebrates have characteristics making it more likely for them to evolve technologically-capable intelligence than it is for, say, insects to evolve it is another interesting question.

Print-On-Demand publishing: will it allow academics to compete with major publishers?

Since I'm thinking of writing a scholarly book or two, I wonder whether print-on-demand publishing houses, combined with outlets like Amazon, allow academics to effectively compete directly with the more usual academic publishers like Springer, Cambridge UP, Oxford UP, etc...?  I've recently noticed that in ordering new books from all three of these publishers, I've frequently been sent what look like print-on-demand editions.  Here's a bit on Springer's POD activities.   To take one recent purchase, Faraut and Koranyi's Analysis on Symmetric Cones, Oxford, is now print-on-demand, and they're still charging $200 for it.  It's adequate, but much less attractive than the original edition which has the trademark Oxford deep-blue cloth-covered boards, with nicely finished paper (perhaps excessively sized, even) and extremely crisp type.  The print-on-demand edition is on paper that's not as nice, an almost inkjet-printed appearance where the edges of the characters are just not crisp enough for my taste, and the boards are thick, covered with something glossy, and more prone to warp outward so the book doesn't quite close firmly.  Springer and Cambridge POD books are similar.  It's a little more like you LaTeX'd something, printed it out two-pages-to-a-sheet, cut the sheets in half and glued them into a binding.  (Except maybe your average laser printer would produce sharper results---I'd need to do a direct comparison.)  This is quite serviceable for the right price, for usable math books, but $200 (I was able to find it for less, but still an outrageously high price) seems ridiculous.  But if academics were able to publish their works this way, sell for $40-65, deduct the cost of printing (about which I'm quite curious), do a little yearly accounting and extra business at tax time, and pocket the rest, it might be a much better deal than publishing through a major house.  I suspect that for a good academic work, reputation developed through citations and online access (one could make the book available chapter-by-chaper for free, if desired) might work almost as well as the publicity provided by an academic or corporate publisher.  The major issue might be library purchases, I'm guessing.  Anybody out there have any experience or ideas with this?

More info:  Amazon's POD printing and distribution unit, Createspace (Springer's US partner) has an expanded distribution plan claimed to wholesale books to libraries and bookstores.  Cambridge has partnered with LightningSource.

Here's a video of the Espresso Book Machine, for producing paperback books at or near the point of sale, in action:

Here's Amazon's "Pro Plan" at their CreateSpace. The combination of the terminology "royalties" for the money you get, and "self-publishing", seems, technically, contradictory.   Royalties are paid by a publisher for the right to publish and sell your book; if you were actually self-publishing, you would be hiring Amazon/Createspace to print your book, and do some of its distribution and sales, but what you keep would be profit, not royalties.  So I'm curious which it actually is, in their case.  Anyway, you seem to get about 43% of the list price on sales through Amazon, 23% on their Expanded Distribution Channel (to libraries, bookstores, and "certified resellers" at, presumably, wholesale prices, although maybe not since Amazon labels the entire difference between your share and list price "Our Share"), and 63% through something called an eStore (which is presumably an outlet at your own website, linked to Amazon; more investigation warranted).   Those are on a $16 book; on a $45, 320 page book with black and white interior, it looks like 30% through the EDC, 50% through Amazon, and 70% through your eStore.  I'm guessing this is for a paperback.

So, quite a bit better than the standard academic press royalty which I believe is something like 7% or so, but still, through the expanded distribution channel, not that hefty.

How does one prove that domains of positivity of symmetric nondegenerate bilinear forms are self-dual cones?

On mathoverflow, I've asked how one proves that domains of positivity of symmetric nondegenerate bilinear forms on real vector spaces are self-dual cones.  A bilinear form on a real vector space X is just a map B: X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R} that is linear in each argument.  (In other words, if you fix y, the function B(x,y) that takes x to B(x,y) is linear, and similarly if you fix the other argument.)  It's called nondegenerate if the only x \in X such that B(x,y)=0 for all y, is x=0.  And, of course, it's symmetric if for all x,y, B(x,y)=B(y,x).

A closed domain of positivity of such a form is a maximal set Y such that B(Y,Y) \ge 0.  Maximal means maximal in the ordering of sets by containment, i.e. Y is not contained in any other set Z satisfying B(Z,Z) \ge 0.  This notion was introduced, or at least used, by Max Koecher in the late 1950s, in work that led to the celebrated result, published in 1958 in "The Geodesics of Domains of Positivity"  (well, actually, "Die Geodatische von Positivitatsbereichen" (Mathematische Annalen 135 (1958), pp. 192--202)), that homogeneous self-dual cones in finite dimension are precisely the cones of squares in finite-dimensional formally real (aka Euclidean) Jordan algebras.  Indeed, probably the very interpretation of the main result of that paper as concerning homogeneous self-dual cones relies on the identification of domains of positivity with self-dual cones that I'm looking for a proof of.

If the form were positive semidefinite, i.e. B(x,x) \ge 0 for all x (which implies symmetry) then a domain of positivity for would clearly  be a self-dual cone.  This is practically the definition of a self-dual cone.  The dual of a cone in a real inner product space is the set of all vectors y whose inner product with everything in the cone is nonnegative---and the definition of an inner product on a real vector space is that it's a nondegenerate positive semidefinite bilinear form.  A self-dual cone is one that's equal to its dual cone.

For our definition of domain of positivity, the form was required only to be symmetric, not necessarily also positive semidefinite.  Nevertheless, according to things I've read, its domains of positivity are self-dual cones.   These domains are not necessarily unique, of course, although they are maximal, i.e. no one of them contains another).  Although I have a vague recollection of having seen a proof that they are self-dual, I haven't been able to find the paper or come up with a proof.

It's easy to prove that such a domain is a pointed, convex, closed cone.  A natural way to prove that it is a self-dual cone would be to exhibit a positive semidefinite form B', depending on B and possibly also on Y, such that Y is a domain of positivity of B'.   An idea for how to do this involves the fact that such a form can be diagonalized: we can find a basis x_i for the vector space such that the matrix with elements M_{ij} := B(x_i, x_j) is diagonal, with diagonal elements \epsilon_i \pm 1.  The number of - signs on the diagonal is the signature of the form.  A natural candidate for B' is the Euclidean inner product  \langle u, v \rangle := \sum_i u_i \cdot v_i in the basis x_i (i.e u_i, v_i are the components of u, v in this basis).  That is, we just change the -1's to +1's in the diagonal form of B.

Nondegenerate symmetric bilinear forms are interesting for a variety of reasons.  One of them is that they are closely related to the metric structure on a pseudo-Riemannian manifold.  Something like the following is true: you specify such a form at each point of the manifold, in such a way that the forms at the various points are nicely related to each other, and you've specified the geometric structure of a pseudo-Riemannian manifold.  (One restriction here, I believe, is that the signature of the forms has to be the same everywhere; the forms also need to vary somewhat smoothly, in a manner I should look up and summarize, but not now.)  For example, in the general relativistic description of spacetime, the spacetime manifold has signature -1, 1, 1, 1.  Or 1, -1, -1, -1; people use different conventions.  I'm attracted to 1, -1, -1, -1, because the odd-one-out corresponds in relativity theory to time, and this way, the forward and backward light cones are the (only!) domains of positivity for the form.  I.e. the form is B(v, v') = tt'- (xx' + yy' + zz'); we have B(v, v) = t^2 - (x^2 + y^2 + z^2) (here v = (t, x, y, z), etc...).  Interestingly, with the other choice of signature, the domains of positivity consist of spacelike vectors, and there is a continuum of them.  To get a picture of what's going on, consider one time and two space dimensions, with signature 1, -1, -1.  You can visualize this in \mathbb{R}^3, with the vertical t axis as time (associated with the -1 diagonal element of the form) and the horizontal xy planes for constant time t as a spacelike plane.  If you rotate the 45 degree line between t and say the x axis, around the t axis, you get the boundary of a double cone, the forward and backward light cones.  But similar cones pointing along any ray in the xy plane are clearly domains of positivity for the form.  I suspect lots of other cones---basically, any self-dual cone you can fit into the "conic doughnut" that is the closed complement of the double light-cone, i.e. into the spacelike (and null) vectors, are also domains of positivity for this form.

My main reason for interest in the problem isn't pseudo-Riemannian geometry, however.  More on the main reason later.  (It has to do with the Koecher result cited above).

If you found this problem first on mathoverflow, and you have the answer, please post your answer there, and link to it here if you feel like it; if you encountered it first here, please post the answer here indicating you encountered the problem here, and it would be nice if you'd also post it on mathoverflow indicating you found it on my blog.  We can have a little race between we happy few who read this blog, and the overflowing mathematicians.  I know who I'm betting on---your mission, readers, should you choose to accept it, and should any of you actually exist, is to prove me wrong!

(Thanks to Will Jagy, of MSRI, for noticing that I defined nondegeneracy wrong here at first: as requiring that the only x for which B(x,x)=0 is x=0. This wrong definition, corrected above, of course says that the form has no nontrivial "isotropic" or "null" vectors (ones for which B(x,x)=0). And we certainly don't want to assume that! Sorry about the slip-up, which I dont think affected anything else in the post.)

Pablo Arrighi: Unitarity plus Causality implies Locality

Pablo Arrighi of the University of Grenoble spoke on his result, with collaborators Vincent Nesme and Reinhard Werner (both now at the Leibniz University Hannover), that  Unitarity plus Causality implies Locality, at the PiQuDos seminar today at Perimeter.  I heard him speak on this result over a year ago at Foundational Structures for Quantum Information and Computation at Obergurgl, Austria;  I thought it was one of the standout talks of the workshop, and his talk today, which also covered more recent work along the same lines, reminded me how interesting I'd found his result when I first heard it.

Arrighi, Nesme, and Werner consider a quantum system associated with a graph having a countably infinite number of vertices, and an arbitrary edge structure.  At each vertex is a quantum system, finite or infinite dimensional, represented by a Hilbert space.  The edge structure is supposed to represent some notion of two systems being "nearby", so that it's physically reasonable for them to influence each other during one step of time evolution.  Roughly speaking, this is their notion of "causality" of a time evolution: that only such nearby systems have any influence on each other.  They define a Hilbert space associated with this infinite set of quantum systems.  It's not quite the tensor product of this infinite set of Hilbert spaces (which would not necessarily be a Hilbert space), but rather the span of all "finitely supported configurations", i.e. product states having a special state  | 0 \rangle on all but a finite number of systems.  (You can do things  C^* -algebraically and do better, Pablo said, but this should be good enough.)  Their main result states, roughly speaking, that if a unitary evolution satisfies "causality", it can be represented as a circuit of quantum operators each acting on a neighborhood (a vertex and its neighbors) in the graph; the circuit has depth no greater than the square of the degree of the graph, plus 2.  (The degree of the graph is the largest number of edges emanating from a vertex.  For example, in lattices that repeat a hypercube of some dimension as their basic structure, the degree is twice the dimension).  In other words, there is a representation via "local"---although multi-way---interactions, happening in parallel on disjoint neighborhoods.  It may be necessary to take several successive rounds of interactions, happening on different sets of neigborhoods, but it's never necessary to take more than the degree squared plus two rounds.  So in a "spatial" hypercubic lattice in N dimensions, you never need more than 4N^2+2 rounds of interactions of interactions with neighbors.  (True, these are 2N+1-body interactions.)

I still haven't finished saying what the result is, because I didn't yet say (except roughly at the beginning) what the assumption of causality is.  It's that the state of the quantum system at a vertex after the overall unitary evolution U on the entire (infinite!) graph, depends only on the state of its neighbors before the evolution.  By state, he means reduced density matrix, after the other systems are traced out.  (Equivalently, in the Heisenberg picture we could say that an operator "supported only at site x", i.e. of the form "A at site x tensor the identity everywhere else", has, when evolved with  U^\dagger , support only at the neigborhood of x, i.e., is of the form "Something on the tensor product of x's neighborhood, tensored with the identity everyplace else".)

Now, given that causality is defined by the influence of a state at a node in the graph propagating only to nearest neighbors (and the node itself) during the unitary evolution, it's perhaps not so surprising that it has a representation in terms of interactions among neighbors.  The important thing to remember, though, is that the causality condition concerns all the overlapping neighborhoods in the graph simultaneously, while the circuit-local representation involves only nonoverlapping neighborhoods, interacting in parallel, in each layer of the circuit, and bounds the number of layers as described above.

Actually, what I've described is a corollary to the main theorem, since this corollary has more immediate intuitive import.  I'll leave you to follow the link to the paper at the beginning of this post, if you want to see the details of the theorem as well.  Also, I've talked as if an edge between two nodes means that either node can influence the other during the evolution; actually, the authors allow for directed graphs, so that (x,y) maybe be an edge in the graph without (y,x) also being one;  the notions of causality and locality are then adjusted to refer to the graph and its transpose (i.e. the one specified by transposing its adjacency matrix) appropriately.  Here, a directed edge (x,y) in the graph means site x can influence site y in one step of unitary evolution;  (y,x) means y can influence x, and it's possible in their framework to allow influence in one direction but not the other, if desired.

One more thing, though: for those who think that this is too obvious, according to Pablo the analogous theorem probably doesn't hold if unitaries are replaced by completely positive maps.  He also thinks there is not a direct analogue even for classical stochastic evolution.  The development of an appealing strengthening of Causality that would allow a similar representation theorem for completely positive maps is something he's actively working on.

The talk also covered some related work that's more recent, such as cool results about the notion of "intriniscally universal" quantum cellular automata on certain kinds of graphs.  These things can simulate the action of any other cellular automaton by means of a short encoding, which takes the state of each cell in the simulated automaton to an encoded state on a block of adjacent cells in the graph of the universal automaton;  several steps---say,  K steps---of the universal automaton then simulate the action of the simulated automaton, on the encoded state.  After  K L steps of the universal automaton, one can apply the inverse of the encoding map, to obtain the state that would have been obtained under  L steps of the simulated automaton.   A paper (with Jonathan Grattage)   is here.

The talk should soon be available at PIRSA.

QIP=PSPACE for the layperson I: Complexity Classes and Polynomial Time

Next time you're at a party and someone asks "hey, did you hear that Britney Spears was seen with the lead actor from Desperate Housewives at an L.A. disco last week?", try replying "No, but did you hear that Rahul Jain, Zhengfeng Ji, Sarvagya Uphadyay, and John Watrous showed that QIP=PSPACE in July?  This is likely to be a foolproof way of ensuring you don't get invited to any parties hosted by your interlocutor, which is likely to be a good thing.  If, however, your conversation partner is thinking fast enough to  reply, "No, so give me the skinny on it," you're going to want to be prepared.  Luckily it's not all that hard.  This is the first in a series of posts that will enable you to answer such a comeback in detail, captivating entire the party for at least a short while, and clearing your social schedule for months to come, as well as leaving you free in the moderately near-term to enjoy whatever remains of the Sutter Home Pink Zinfandel at the drinks table.  John Watrous gave an excellent colloquium at the IQC (Institute for Quantum Computing) yesterday, on the above-referenced work showing the the complexity classes QIP and PSPACE are identical. I originally imagined writing a fairly technical post aimed at colleagues; they will probably want to skip to number II or maybe even III; this post sets the stage for defining the complexity classes QIP and PSPACE, by reviewing the notion of complexity classes.

Complexity classes are, roughly speaking, sets (although I imagine the term "class" is used instead of "set" advisedly, for the set-theory-minded among you---perhaps I will come back to this) of computational problems.  Normally, they are taken to be classes of decision problems: problems of the form:  given an input from a set of possible inputs (the specification of this set is part of the specification of a particular computational problem), decide whether it has, or does not have, a certain property.  To say that a computer program solves such a problem is to say that it outputs "0" if the input doesn't have the property, and "1" if it does.  Normally, the set of possible inputs to a computational problem is taken to be countably infinite (like, for instance, the integers, or the set of finite-length strings of 0's or 1's ("binary strings"), or the set of ASCII text strings...).  So, an example of a problem would be "take a finite string of 0s and 1s; is the number of 1s odd?"  This problem is called PARITY, since evenness or oddness is a property known as the "parity" of a number.  Another example, often called OR, also involves binary strings as inputs; it asks, "is there a 1 in the string"?  Determining whether an integer is prime or not is another example; where the inputs are now integers instead of binary strings.  (But they can be coded, and often are coded, as binary strings---that is, they are written in their base-2 expansion.)  A problem that takes pairs of integers, instead of single integers, as inputs is to determine whether one integer divides another.  There are also more complicated problems, in which the output is not "0" or "1", but is drawn from a larger set of possibilities, but we won't discuss them much here.  An example would be: given an integer, tell us whether or not it is prime and if it isn't, exhibit a nontrivial factorization of it.

Not just any class of decision problems is a complexity class, although I haven't seen (nor do I expect to see) a formal definition of "complexity class", or even much in the way of necessary conditions for being a complexity class.  A complexity class is supposed to reflect something about how hard it is to solve a decision problem, and is often described as "the set of all problems that can be solved by computations of *this sort*", where "this sort" describes some model of how one might do computations.  The model is often quite zany compared to how we actually compute things, but it's rigorously specified.

Now, a computational decision problem, as we've defined it, in most cases clearly can't be "solved" once and for all by a computer.  It involves a countably infinite set of possible inputs, and so the "full solution" would involve listing, for each of these inputs, whether the answer is "0" or "1".  This answer would take an infinite amount of space (and presumably an infinite amount of time, given a lower bound on the amount of time it takes to write a character) just to write down.  So if we want to relate problems like this to reasonable notions of computation, we need to discuss programs that give the right answer for whatever input is presented.  To say things about how hard the problem is is not to say how hard it is to write down all the answers, but rather we need a notion of how hard it is to do the computation on an input.  What's often done is to study how the resources required---the number of computational steps, and the amount of computer memory needed---scale with the size of the input.  This means, of course, that we need not just a countable set of inputs, but one equipped with a notion of size.  In the case of binary strings, the length of the string is what's used.  This works for numbers, too---we just use the number of bits in the binary expansion.  (Up to a constant factor, this is the same as the number of digits in its decimal expansion.)  This is why you may need to choose things like "128-bit RSA key" versus "256-bit RSA key" when doing secure internet transactions, for example:  the security of these transactions is based on the idea that it's hard to factor integers, and what "hard" means here is roughly that the amount of computational resources needed to factor grows faster than any polynomial, with the number N of bits in the binary expansion of the number.  If I remember correctly, the worst-case resources for factoring an N-bit number using the best currently known algorithms scale as around  C 2^{N^1/3} , i.e. they are (up to a proportionality constant C) exponential in the cube root of the number of bits.  More needs to be said, of course---not every N-bit number will take this long to factor, but for large enough N, some numbers will take this long.  For cryptographic security, it's actually important to use a procedure for choosing key that is overwhelmingly likely to pick such hard instances---multiplying together large enough primes is, I guess, thought to work.  This is, of course, a side issue:  the main point is that the definitions of complexity classes often contain reference to how the resources used by a program that solves a decision in problem in the class, in a particular model of computation, scale with the size of the input.  The very important complexity class P, for polynomial time, is roughly the class of decision problems for which there's a polynomial Q (the polynomial may depend on the problem) that gives an upper bound to the time that it takes to solve the problem in a standard computational model closely related to actual computers, namely the Turing machine model (or any model polynomially equivalent to this, such as the  \lambda -calculus introduced by Alonzo Church at around the same time Turing introduced the Turing machine).  That is, if  |x| is the length of input  x , the time it takes a Turing machine to solve the problem on input  x is no greater than  Q(|x|) .

The notion of polynomial time computation is important in the definition of many other complexity classes, and it's also the complexity class that's perhaps the most reasonable candidate for a class of "efficiently solvable" decision problems.  In actual practice, of course, we often solve smallish instances---or expend huge amounts of resources to solve moderate-sized instances---of problems from harder complexity classes;  and occasionally, we have polynomial algorithms for problems for which we'd like to solve large instances, but can't because the degree of the polynomial is too high.  If you hang out with cell-phone security folks, for instance, you'll find that encoding and decoding of messages that is linear in key length is considered a huge advantage compared to quadratic in the key length; forget about higher degree.  Here the small size of cell-phone processors is important.  But degree of a polynomial---and even, sometimes, the constant out front---can be important for big machines, too.  The ellipsoids methods for linear and semidefinite programming, although polynomial, has seen little practical use; interior-point methods, also polynomial, revolutionized the field as they perform much better in practice.  (I'm ashamed to say I don't know offhand if it's the constant or the degree that's mostly responsible for this.)  Actually, for LP the simplex method, which is worst-case exponential, is still in wide use because it performs just fine on most instances---the hard ones appear to be rare and bizarre.  But despite these caveats, P is an important complexity class, with a definite relevance to the line between what it's practical to compute and what it's not.

In the next instalment, I'll cover the classes IP, QIP, and PSPACE---classes that, it's pretty clear, go far beyond what it's practical to compute, but which are fun to think about nonetheless.  (I presume they have more scientific relevance than just being fun; perhaps we can be enlightened about that in the comments.)

Keep on splittin'

OK, I just had to copycat this link.  Via the Quantum Pontiff, Universe Splitter, a supposed new app for the iphone that supposedly hooks up to a quantum randomness generator, allowing you to condition your decisions on quantum randomness and ensure---if you believe in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics---that you can "have your cake and eat it too.  I hope this thing's for real, but unless it's just my lack of App savvy, Apple may not be buying the Everett interpretation.

Keep on Splittin

Keep on Splittin'

Gross, Mueller, Colbeck, and Dahlsten: "All reversible dynamics in maximally non-local theories are trivial"

David Gross, Markus Mueller, Roger Colbeck, and Oscar Dahlsten have considered the "maximal non-signaling tensor product" of "boxlets", and shown that the reversible dynamics of this state space consists just of permutations of the systems (the boxlets) followed by reversible local transformations (i.e., ones on the individual boxlets).

What the heck does that mean, you ask?  Well, "boxlets" were introduced in several contexts.  In the "operational quantum logic" literature they're sometimes called "semiclassical test spaces".  In quantum foundations and informations, they were introduced as a generalization of a notion of Popescu and Rohrlich, who introduced the two-measurement, two-outcome-per-measurement boxlet in order to describe correlations between measurement results on distinct systems that can be stronger than quantum correlations, but still don't allow someone ("Alice") in possession of one of the systems to signal to the other ("Bob") just by making measurements on her system.

A "boxlet" is a system on which there are M distinct alternative measurements one can make, each with K outcomes.  (More complex versions allow different measurements to have different numbers of outcomes.)  The allowable states of a boxlet are given by specifying M probability distributions, each one over K alternatives:  for each measurement, the probabilities of each of its K outcomes.  All possible lists of M such distributions are allowed; this is a convex, compact subset of an MK dimensional vector space (one dimension for each probability).  The M normalization constraints mean that this set lies in an MK-M (i.e., M(K-1)) dimensional affine subspace  (higher dimensional generalization of the line, plane, etc... of high-school geometry).  The possible states of a pair of such systems are given by the "maximal tensor product" of a pair of these compact convex state spaces.  The technical definition of maximal tensor product of state spaces can be found here.  Another way of defining this is that it's the state space of the  Foulis-Randall tensor product  of the "test spaces" (definitions reviewed in Sections II and IV of this paper) describing each of the boxlets.  A test space is just a collection of subsets of some set; the elements of the set interpreted as measurement outcomes, and the subsets, called "tests", as measurements.  The semiclassical test space of a boxlet like the ones I described above just consists of a set of MK elements, partitioned into M sets of K elements.  A state on a (finite, like the ones in question) test space is a function from the set to the real numbers between zero and 1, i.e. to probabilities, such that for each test, the probabilities of the elements of the test add up to one.  The Foulis-Randall tensor product of two test spaces just takes their Cartesian product, and allows any probability assignments such that the "marginal states" obtained by fixing a measurement on one side and marginalizing all the joint distributions of this fixed measurement with measurements on the other side, is independent of which measurement is marginalized over.  That is, Alice can't signal to Bob (by affecting the probabilities of the outcomes of one or more of his measurements) just by her choice of measurement.

Now, a transformation of the state space is an affine map from the state space to itself (i.e. one that preserves convex combination, which seems only reasonable), and a reversible one is one that has an inverse that is also an affine map of the state space.  So what GMCD are saying is that, if you combine boxlets this way, there are no very interesting reversible dynamics:  just combinations of local reversible dynamics on the individual boxlets, and permuting the boxes amongst themselves.

An interesting question is, can one extend this result to maximal tensor products of *arbitrary* systems with convex state space (locally equipped, let's say, with the maximal set of possible effects)?

See the comments on the Information Causality thread at Dave Bacon's blog for a bit more discussion (and related interesting matters).

Tension detected!!! Worldview manager analyzes my views on quantum mechanics

Scott Aaronson has gotten a couple of students to help him realize Worldview Manager, which asks you to indicate a level of agreement or disagreement with various statements on a topic, and then detects "tension", i.e. something akin to inconsistency, between your responses.  No significant tension was found in my views on quantum computing, but on quantum mechanics (mostly fairly foundational questions), here's what the thing came up with:

"Tension detected!

You indicated

  • Disagreement with the statement "There is a single wave function for the universe, which has been evolving unitarily since the big bang."
  • Agreement with the statement "There is no faster-than-light communication."

It would seem that this is logically inconsistent. Please consider modifying your responses. If you do not want to resolve this tension now, you can defer it until later.

If you are confused as to why this represents a logical inconsistency, you can read our explanation."

I did, although you could more properly say I was being too lazy to even be confused...  As a not entirely irrelevant side note, I only indicated 20% agreement (via a slider scale with no numbers attached, though) with the "no faster-than-light communication" statement (and 80% disagreement with the other).

"Here is a brief explanation as to why your answer selection represents a logical inconsistency.
Let

* A be the statement:

There is no faster-than-light communication.

* B be the statement:

There is a single wave function for the universe, which has been evolving unitarily since the big bang.

* C be the statement:

The collapse of the wave function (i.e., measurement) is a real physical process, not explainable in terms of unitary evolution.

Then A implies B as follows:

* One of C or B because

If there's no collapse process, then presumably one could in principle write down a wavefunction for the entire universe.

* C implies not A because

If collapse is a real physical process, then it requires a form of faster-than-lightsignalling when applied to entangled states."

I guess I don't yet agree with the "presumably" above, and so not with "One of C or B".  I don't believe "there's no collapse process", just that it's not a "physical process".  On the view I lean toward, the wavefunction is probably not a "real physical entity", it is a tool we are using to help understand and predict the behavior of systems, so the fact that its collapse isn't a physical process doesn't imply that there's no collapse.

Time for some coffee.  Am I missing something?

Just for the record, my full answers so far:

Quantum Computing
The Threshold Theorem provides a convincing demonstration that, because of the linearity of quantum mechanics, it is possible in principle to correct errors in a quantum computer faster than they occur. 80%80%80%80% 80% Agreement
It is possible to simulate any quantum system on a classical computer in polynomial time (i.e., exponentially faaster than the "naïve" method of writing down the entire wavefunction). -80%-80%-80%-80% 80% Disagreement
Quantum mechanics as described in standard physics textbooks is an accurate framework for all of physics. -40%-40%-40%-40% 40% Disagreement
If quantum mechanics as described in standard physics textbooks is true, then it is possible in principle to build a scalable quantum computer. 90%90%90%90% 90% Agreement
Any quantum computer will inevitably be subject to noise and decoherence that will prevent it from exponentially outperforming a classical computer. -80%-80%-80%-80% 80% Disagreement
A fast classical algorithm for factoring integers will eventually be discovered. -20%-20%-20%-20% 20% Disagreement
The Extended Church-Turing Thesis is false: that is, it is possible in principle to build computers that efficiently solve problems outside the complexity class BPP. 30%30%30%30% 30% Agreement
A quantum computer is essentially an analog computer, and will fail to scale for the same reasons classical analog computers failed to scale. -80%-80%-80%-80% 80% Disagreement
Quantum Mechanics
There is a single wave function for the universe, which has been evolving unitarily since the big bang. -80%-80%-80%-80% 80% Disagreement
Quantum mechanics is an experimentally successful description of the behavior of microscopic systems. 90%90%90%90% 90% Agreement
For a physical theory to make sense, it must have some notion of "the past" besides just memories and records in the present. 0%0%0% Completely neutral
There is no faster-than-light communication. 20%20%20%20% 20% Agreement
Mixed states, as the most general representation of an agent's knowledge of a quantum system, are more fundamental than pure states. 0%0%0% Completely neutral
Quantum mechanics is about our knowledge and information, not directly about ontology (i.e., what really exists). 30%30%30%30% 30% Agreement
When measuring a quantum state, we have the freedom to choose the measurement basis (for instance, whether we want to measure the position or momentum). 30%30%30%30% 30% Agreement
The outcome of every quantum measurement is "preordained" from the beginning of the universe. -50%-50%-50%-50% 50% Disagreement
Quantum mechanics shows that consciousness or observation must play some fundamental role in the laws of physics. 20%20%20%20% 20%

Physics and Song: Perimeter to U2 Tour 360, Rogers Centre, Toronto 9/16/2009, courtesy of Blackberry and/or Mike Lazaridis

Courtesy of Mike Lazaridis (CEO and co-founder of Research in Motion, the company that makes the Blackberry, and founder of Perimeter Institute, where I work), and/or his company (THANKS!!) the staff at Perimeter Institute was bused to Toronto and treated to the first of two U2 shows in the Rogers Centre, downtown next to the CN tower.  The roof was open on the arena, and those on the west side could see changing, glowing colors lighting up the elevator strip all the way up the CN tower, and encircling the observation deck. In my account of the concert below, I'll link to mostly YouTube videos to that give a play-by-play record of most of the concert---be warned that some of these are pretty low quality, though a few are surprisingly good.

Overall, the concert rocked.  Although I haven't followed U2 closely, I have a couple of their CDs from quite a while back---the excellent Achtung Baby, and a double live one, plus a few LPs kicking around that I haven't listened to recently.  They haven't lost their touch.  I particularly enjoyed some of the songs from their new album: the opening sequence "Breathe",  "Magnificent", and "Get on Your Boots".  My notes call the latter "surrealistic hard rock, with fuzz bass and Nirvana-y guitar riffs".  Its title and tacky-but-tasty riffs (think snarfing a box of Snyder's of Hanover Honey Mustard & Onion Pretzels) remind me of Sonic Youth's "Dirty Boots".   I liked the live "Boots" a bit better than the studio video version you can hear here--- a little grittier and harder-rocking.

Their traveling stage set (apparently one of three---the setup takes long enough that they need to start in one venue before the shows are finished in the next) is a giant pale-green thing, adorned with orange buttons and a tower sticking out the top, that looks like a cross between a giant four-legged beetle and the a lunar lander, and forms a tall canopy over the circular stage.  Under the belly of this thing, there's a huge circular video screen made of elongate hexagonal chunks, which can be interpreted as the thrust nozzle of a rocket engine.  Half-way through the show, the thing elongates vertically to more than twice its size, revealing that the screens are mounted on diagonally criss-crossing metal rods hinged to each other as in a folding set of coat-pegs, or wash-hanging rack.  It's used to show closeups of the performers, and various other graphics integral to the show.

We unfortuately missed the opening act, Snow Patrol, as the bus ride from Waterloo to Toronto is a lengthy proposition when you leave at 4 PM on a weekday.  The show started out with the bug thing towering over the empty stage as Bowie's "Space Oddity" was played on the sound system.  Then some moody, pretty music as the lights went out, the band came on, and the spots came up on them one by one, segueing into the band playing "Breathe" off their new album  (Here's longer, but better, video of the whole initial sequence from the last part of Space Oddity, through the band entrance and "Breathe").   Initially the sound balance left something to be desired---the low bass and kickdrum frequencies that resonate in your chest, and below, were overemphasized for my taste, while the actual low and low-midrange frequencies where the bass melody lives were underemphasized.  And the non-kickdrum parts of the drumset, especially at lower frequencies, were a bit undermixed too (partially remedied by Bono's call for "more drums" early in the set).  But basically the sound was pretty good, especially for an open arena which is probably pretty hard to fill sonically.  Vocals and guitar lines were pretty clear.  The band was able to carry things through Breathe and "No Line on the Horizon" as the sound settled down, or I stopped noticing it, and by Get On Your Boots things were rocking just fine.  (Here's some good video footage, with crummy no-bass sound, of the CN tower ... not sure this is actually "No Line" as claimed by the tuber who posted it, though.)  Here's the beginning of Magnificent (another song I liked from the new album, here's another snippet of it, and here's probably a better video of the whole song, from near the stage.)  This was followed by Get on Your Boots---no acceptable video from Toronto, so here it is from the opening show of the tour, in Barcelona's Olympic Stadium.  "Beautiful Day" from 2000's "All That You Can't Leave Behind" ended with a little snippet from Elvis Costello's "Alison", though with an somewhat altered, and I thought less interesting, melody.  "I Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking For" from Achtung Baby, here beginning with the audience doing a good bit of the singing, was the first of the oldies but goodies for me, followed by a nice version of Elevation (also from "All..."), with the band really getting into a disjointed but rocking groove appropriate to the somewhat "surrealistic" lyrics ("why can't the sun // shoot me from a gun..").  "Your Blue Room" was a classic, lazing-across-inner-space "orbit" song, at a meandering tempo with looping "satellite" motifs and footage shot from the International Space Station, and a little sprechstimme from Commander Frank.  Nice touch (as was the LEM-like stage-set)  in the anniversary year of the moon landing.  (Here it is from Chicago a few days earlier, from farther out so you can see the video display.) [Unknown Caller]  Until the End of the World resumes the sequence from Achtung Baby (begun with "Still Haven't Found...")  An even better video of End. StayUnforgettable Fire (nice sound and video, but cut off after 2:50.  ).  This is when the rocket nozzle video screen got vertically elongated.  More good video of Unforgettable Fire; relatively decent sound for this kind of thing, but bass-challenged.  City of Blinding LightsVertigo / Pump It Up.  Bono announced that Elvis was in the house; this, and the bit of Alison and Oliver's Army, were presumably in his honor.  (Some parts of this sound like Dirty Boots as well.)  I'll Go Crazy if I Don't Go Crazy Tonight (sound issues), a lightweight but hard-rocking pogo-ey, poppy bit of infectious fluff off the new album.  Another version of Crazy with different sound issues and funny audience vocal.  Sunday Bloody Sunday (OK sound, long view; late beginning).  Ends with a snippet of Elvis Costello's "Oliver's Army".  MLK, for Aung San Suu Kyi.  Walk On, and One, for Aung San Suu Kyi (seriously bad audience vocals from near whoever recorded this, but with some redeeming value (humor)).  Amazing Grace.  Where the Streets Have no Name.

Ultraviolet (Light My Way), another oldie but goodie from Achtung Baby.  Bono doesn't slack off when covering old songs...the phrasing is different in different performances, his heart and mind is in it.  With or Without You.  Moment of Surrender.